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Abstract 
The public standing of lawyers has always been somewhat ambivalent. On the one 
hand, they have been taken for a conceited technocratical elite with their own 
incomprehensible language. On the other hand, they have been cherished as the 
number one trouble-shooter and peace-maker. Today, the traditional monopoly of 
lawyers has come under pressure. Rivaling professions such as mediators want to 
have their share of the conflict resolution market. Still, lawyers are likely to retain 
the greater bulk. 
The author identifies and discusses the following reasons for this predominance: 
− the affinity of lawyers with the state and public authority; 
− the reflex of the authority of law; 
− the complex nature of legal systems and the ensuing need for 
professionalisation; 
− a particular training in rhetorical, linguistic, communicative and social skills; 
− the function of lawyers as ‘high priests’ of the judicial ritual; 
− the real or supposed competence of lawyers to master each and every 
challenge irrespective of its nature and background; 
− homogeneity of the group;  
− the ability of lawyers to embrace and ‘swallow’ other disciplines. 
The topic is part of the general discourse on the role of professional actors. 
Key words 
Lawyers and the power; the power of lawyers; the role of professionalism in conflict 
resolution. 
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1. Introduction 
Architects build houses, surgeons perform operations, lawyers settle (legal) 
conflicts. This allocation seems to be beyond question in the world of today with its 
division of labour which has developed over the centuries. Actually, the law itself 
attributes a privileged position to lawyers, since a court- based system of rendering 
justice provides work for a whole set of professional actors.  
Over the last decades lawyers have as a profession come under pressure. 
Overcoming the barriers between those who administer the law and those who are 
being administered (Bankowski, Mungham 1981, p. 85), informal justice (Matthews 
1988), lay and community involvement (Nelken 1985, p. 239) are only some of the 
slogans of movements which converge in their desire to deconstruct the formalised 
justice system and to (re)construct alternative conflict resolutions, even to give the 
conflict back to the people (Christie 1977, p. 1). What started as a participatory 
movement soon ended in another professionalisation. Rivals to jurists appeared on 
the scene. They soon offered their own social technology: mediation. In a way, 
competition was opened on the social peace market. This development has 
sensitised us once again for the question of the place of law and jurists in this 
market (Zauberman 1990, p. 301, 306 et s). This question is of course not 
altogether new. The role of lawyers has always been contested. Throughout the 
history of justice systems, it has been a matter of debate in whom we should trust 
when it comes to the adjudication of conflicts: professionals or lay people. 
Throughout the history of justice systems, the judicial system has been discredited 
as a world of its own. Throughout the history of justice systems, the legal rites and 
the legal language have been criticised for their alienating effects.  
Yet, on the other hand, jurists in particular judges have time and again been 
cherished as the number one trouble-shooter, the ultimate defender of citizen’s 
rights and the banner-holders of freedom. Only recently, in a fierce labour law 
conflict between Lufthansa and the pilots’ trade union, the Frankfurt labour court 
judge Silke Kohlschitter was hailed for her courageous and successful go at bringing 
the parties together again.1 The French Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature has 
captured the certain ambivalence of public opinion with regard to the justice system 
in the formula: “La France a mal de sa justice, mais les Français lui sont 
profondément attachés comme garantie essentielle de leurs libertés.”2 
Therefore, in a debate about alternatives to judicial decision-making, we should not 
only address the alternatives and their operational philosophy (Jung 1998, p. 913). 
We should also try to reassess the role of lawyers. This is of course no easy task. I 
do not pretend to exhaust the topic, nor to present ready-made answers. Rather, I 
would like to raise some questions and issues which deserve closer scrutiny.  
2. Historical insights 
Actually, lawyers, in particular judges, had a good start:3 Traditionally, judges 
derived their authority from the King. Yet, since every power was derived from 
God, the judges managed to cultivate a standing of their own. Kojève calls them an 
archetype of authority (Kojève 2004, p. 25). Judges resembled priests. Already 
Ulpian spoke of “sacerdotes iustitiae”.4 Still, Rome has already seen many 
upheavals of the plebs against the optimates who cultivated their monopoly of 
juridical knowledge.5 Judicial independence received additional backing from the 
                                                 
1 Süddeutsche Zeitung of February 24, 2010. 
2 This statement figures on the back cover of the publication Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature, Les 
Français et leur justice, Paris 2008. 
3 For an albeit brief rehearsal of the history of judges (Jung 2006, p. 17 et s.)  
4 D.1.1.1 pr. up to 1: „Iuri operam daturum prius nosse oportet, unde nomen iuris descendat. Est autem 
a iustitia appellatum: nam, ut eleganter Celsus definit, ius est ars boni et aequi. Cuius merito quis nos 
sacerdotes appellet ...“. 
5 An observation made by Carbonnier (1996, p. 67), when dealing with “la classe juridique”. 
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professionalisation during the late Middle Ages, ending up in “a self-contained” or 
closed system, a “science”. It should not be overlooked though that this 
professionalisation did not draw criticism right away, since it helped overcome the 
somewhat arbitrary justice administered by lay people. 
Yet, in particular advocates have fallen into dismay time and again. The anonymous 
French “Farce de Maître Pierre Pathelin” which conquered the French market places 
in the middle of the 15th century conveyed the message that common sense will 
carry the day, since the simple shepherd does in the end beat the “maître” with his 
own weapons. The maître had instructed his client, the shepherd, not to answer 
any question at court but to simply respond by saying “baaa”. In the end, when 
asked to pay the “maître”, the shepherd used the same strategy, just saying 
“baaa”. 
Montaigne (Jung 2008, p. 437) served the perhaps most devastating blow ever 
against the whole profession in his “Essays”. His polemic starts out with a sceptical 
assessment of the flood of laws, so to speak a different statute for each and every 
situation. He continues by suggesting: Why not just ask any stranger to settle 
conflicts, or elect somebody on the market place or entrust judging to a wise man? 
Furthermore: King Fernando, when sending settlers to the West-Indies, was right in 
ordering that no jurist should accompany them, since jurists only produce quarrels. 
And finally: law is, as a science, liable to produce trouble.  
He closes his philippic with a critical appraisal of the legal language and the 
business of making distinctions and of toying with authorities instead of looking at 
the text itself. Thus Montaigne expresses an ever so modern longing for simplicity,6 
for fewer laws, for laws that are self-explanatory, for explanation instead of 
obfuscation. He doubts that truth can be found by multiplying interpretations 
though he has to concede that hardly ever two people will be exactly of the same 
opinion.  
Montaigne can be read as a prelude to the contemporary “Justizkritik”. Apparently, 
the “nostalgia for a pastoral society, with the mythic figure of the justice of the 
peace; the good, peace-making judge living in harmony with his fellow citizens and 
successfully reconciling warring-parties.” that Zauberman (1990, p. 307) refers to, 
permeates history. 
On the other hand, in particular the judges, have emerged over the times as an 
indispensable control power in the emerging system of checks and balances. This is 
well illustrated by the message which circulated in the aftermath of the famous 
“Müller Arnold” case in 18th century Prussia: “Il y a des juges à Berlin” (Schmidt 
1947, p. 11, 26 et s.). Interestingly enough, at the same time, in France, the 
decline of the parlements was captured in the formula “Dieu nous préserve de 
l’équité des parlements”. The tricky advocate Azzeccagarbugli, a character in 
Manzoni’s “I Promessi Sposi”, alludes to a certain divide within the legal profession 
in the sense that advocates take most of the blame. This may not be 
universalisable, since, for example in France, advocates are in a fairly high esteem. 
What seems to be universalisable, however, is the impression that, in the terms of 
Simenon’s famous commissaire de police Maigret, the world of jurists is an island 
separated from the real world (Jung 2010, p. 885). Extrapolated onto philosophical 
heights we can sense a certain dichotomy between democratic values and those of 
professionalisation. In other words, the question of authority is also the question of 
legitimacy.7 
                                                 
6 For a modern echo cf. Conseil National de la Magistrature (note 2), p. 15 : “Les citoyens souffrent aussi 
de la complexité du jargon judiciaire, de ce style et de ces formules entretenues depuis des siècles ...” 
7 See Hörnle’s account with regard to lay justice (2006, p. 135). 
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3. The lawyers and the power 
Lawyers have always been close to the gravitational centres of power. Let it be 
kings, or parliaments, governments, administrations, not to speak of the judiciary 
itself: jurists will sit at the “levers”. Governance through law puts lawyers in a 
privileged position. Lawyers’ grasp of power reflects the intimate relationship 
between politics and law. Also, since law is the language of democracy8 we are in 
need of (professional) interpreters. Talking about the authority of lawyers inevitably 
raises the wider issue of the authority of law as such. Perhaps even more 
important, it leads us to the aggregate status of law. Law is not self-explanatory. At 
least we need a certain technique to arrive at a full understanding even if 
everybody should be able to grasp the basic message. 
The affinity between jurists and the state also shows at the level of legal education. 
Lawyers are trained to understand, if not to run, a state organisation. Moreover, in 
some countries, like Germany, the decrees in law are still being conferred in the 
name of the state. In France, the state has a firm grip on the training of the 
administrative elite, by way of the École Nationale d’Administration though its scope 
goes beyond the law. In Germany, more than one fifth of the members of the 
Bundestag are jurists.  
Despite some French reservations with regard to the terminology (“pouvoir vs. 
autorité”), the courts have their share of the power in the state irrespective of the 
question whether we see the courts within or outwith the state structure. The 
French preference for the term “autorité judiciaire” is, however, not without interest 
in our context since it may allude to the fact that the power of the courts is not 
primarily based upon force but upon respect for their decisions. Thus we end up 
with the authority of law itself. In the Kelsenian tradition, authority is too weak a 
word, since law is about force (Kelsen 1960, p. 35). On this background, lawyers 
would, as a functional elite, be part of an apparatus which, in last instance, would 
rely on force. But even if we take authority in the sense of authoritative, lawyers 
will be the main spokespersons when it comes making the law bind by authoritative 
reasoning. Again, jurists belong to the power personal, not by democratic choice 
but by professional standing. However, this standing seems to be reserved to a 
limited number - the in-group so to speak. Most lawyers will never enter as 
Carbonnier has put it “... ce cercle lumineux d’élite étroite où se distribuent 
honnêtement les avantages du pouvoir” (Carbonnier 1996, p. 66). 
4. The power of lawyers 
As a professional elite lawyers acquire in the course of their socialisation a certain 
“savoir faire”. This socialisation process forges a certain unity of the profession and 
a certain corporatism of the mind (Carbonnier 1996, p. 67). This “savoir faire” 
should not be limited to knowing the text of the law and to be able to cite 
paragraphs and definitions. Paraphrasing the title of Honorés Festschrift “The Legal 
Mind” (MacCormick, Birks 1986) it should go beyond. Fact-finding procedures, an 
analytical approach to cases, a specific argumentative tradition in combination with 
a particular juridical rhetoric and, not to forget a training in “audiatur et altera 
pars” will add up to a professional repertoire which is not easy to copy.  
Of course, we all know of the potential detriments of such a socialisation process. 
Throughout history, lawyers have been scoffed at for their ceremoniality, for their 
artificial language, for their schematic approach, for their distance from real life, or 
to put it differently, for the lack of a human touch. There has been an ongoing 
debate for decades on how to install more of that human touch into legal 
proceedings. The certain dissatisfaction with the delivery by lawyers helped to 
promote alternative modes of conflict resolution. Yet, we should not underestimate 
the potential for reform that the legal profession has shown time and again. Their 
                                                 
8 Extrapolated from Habermas (1996, p. 293, 301). 
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opening towards the social sciences has paved the way for a critical rehearsal of the 
traditional standards and working habits. In Germany for example, special 
emphasis has been put on the training of the so-called key competences thus 
(re)introducing communicative, psychological and social skills into legal education 
(Jung 2003, p. 1048). Mediation has also been integrated as a special unit into the 
syllabus. This deserves applause. Yet, it also shows that some of the power of 
lawyers has to do with the fact that they are able to embrace and “swallow” other 
disciplines. The clientele and the legal discipline should profit from that. At the 
same time, there is a risk that the protagonists of the new operational philosophy 
will loose their identity and, in consequence, their potential if they are integrated 
without further ado into the legal context. In a way, mediation will always operate 
in the shadow of the Leviathan.9 I doubt, however, whether mediation will survive 
as an autonomous concept once it has been introduced into the court system in 
form of e.g. the “gerichtsnahe Mediation”.  
As you can see, the lawyers have mobilised and have taken mediation on board. An 
increasing number of German lawyers seek an additional qualification as a 
mediator. Excellent! Yet we should not forget the fate of the historical French juge 
de paix who soon ended up within the regular court system. Lawyers, despite their 
openness for new developments, have a tendency to close the ranks in due course. 
Lawyers are “allrounders”: Tell them that they are supposed to run a bank, a 
publishing house, a newspaper or whatever - they’ll do it. They operate in areas 
which transgress the strictly legal domain. A legal education is presumed to provide 
a set of social and managerial skills which enable lawyers to operate in many fields. 
It may well be, however, that this belief of longstanding does no longer hold true in 
reality. At least it seems to me that lawyers are no longer regarded as “functional 
monopolists”, but that they have rather lost ground to specialists or to other 
generalists such as sociologists, political scientists and economists.  
5. Conclusion 
Looking at our topic from a more principled perspective we come across familiar 
dichotomies such as: 
1. participation vs. professionalism 
2. monopoly vs. competition 
3. tradition vs. change 
4. overall competences vs. specialisation. 
ad1 Lawyers and the law represent the professional element in state 
construction. The normative aspirations of societies tend to call for lawyers 
to implement a program that guarantees the peace of the land. Yet, in 
modern societies, this program is in a constant productive conflict with 
participatory elements and the search for a democratic backdrop. 
ad2 In many areas of conflict resolution lawyers still have the monopoly. 
Monopolists will tend to become complacent and resistant to renovation 
and change. Competition will help avoid a stand-still. 
ad3 Lawyers have a traditional prerogative in conflict resolution. We should 
bear in mind that judges existed before the (written) law. Of course, 
continuity and tradition alone cannot legitimize an institution and its actors. 
So far the major changes have rather taken place within and not outwith 
the legal system. New paradigms of conflict resolution tend to relate to 
certain insufficiencies and failures of the legal process and will therefore 
have difficulties to maintain and develop their ideological and structural 
                                                 
9 More detailed as to the relationship between the justice system and its alternatives Jung (1998, p. 920 
et s.). 
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identity in view of a justice system which is prepared to respond to 
criticism and to take on board new ideas. 
ad4 The field of conflict resolution is also governed by a continued 
specialisation. Such specialisation may give birth to new actors. However, a 
system that is orientated towards the last say of the courts will privilege 
lawyers. Of course many people are dissatisfied with law and the lawyers. 
Yet, at the same time, we see an increasing “proceduralisation” (Jung 
2006, p. 30). Each and every conflict is brought to court. This will keep 
lawyers in bread.  
The debate about the law and the lawyers will never draw to a close. It is beyond 
question though that the authority of law and the authority of lawyers are 
inextricably linked. Lawyers derive much of their authority from the authority of 
law. Conversely, the authority of law is to a certain extent dependent on the 
authority of lawyers. We should therefore keep a close watch on them. 
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